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ANTHONY BUTLER: A FLAWED DIPLOMAT
by Gerald D. Saxon
Anthony Wayne Butler tried desperately to shape the destiny of
both the United States and pre-revolutionary Texas. As the American
charge d'affaires to Mexico during the Andrew Jackson administra-
tion, Butler, driven by contravening motives of duty to himself and
duty to the country, doggedly pursued one of Old Hickory's primary
diplomatic objectives - the acquisition of Texas from the Republic
of Mexico. With his political and financial future tied to the success
of the Texas initiative, Butler worked zealously and at times
unscrupulously to acquire the land west of the Sabine River. Despite
his untiring efforts, Butler's mission ended in failure, a failure
resulting as much from his ambition and ego as from the political
instability of the Mexican Republic.
Butler was born in South Carolina in 1787 (the exact date of his
birth is unknown), and he spent his life scrambling for prestige and
position. Before his appointment as American envoy to Mexico, the
ambitious Butler married the sister of politically influential John J_
Crittenden of Kentucky, attained the rank of colonel during the War
of 1812, served as a Jeffersonian Republican in the legislatures of
Kentucky (1818-1820) and Mississippi (1826-1828), and launched a
successful slave "rental" business.' It was as a businessman that Col-
onel Butler made his first trip to Texas in 1828 to collect payment
for the use of some of his slaves from Stephen F. Austin.' Butler not
only settled his business with Austin, but also traveled extensively
throughout Texas, keeping copious notes on the region's geography,
politics, and precarious ties to Mexico. He left Texas convinced that
its acquisition should be an American diplomatic priority_'
Returning to his home in Mississippi in 1829, Butler was pleas-
ed to learn that his friend Andrew Jackson had been elected presi-
dent. Butler had served under Jackson at the Battle of New Orleans
and he believed that his friend would be receptive to ideas concern-
ing the acquisition of Texas. Eager to share these ideas with Jackson,
and perhaps intending to lobby for a political appointment at the same
time, Butler set out that summer for Washington, D.C. He reached
the nation's capital in early August and quickly arranged a meeting
with Jackson's secretary of state, Martin Van Buren. During his in~
terview with Van Buren, Butler briefly outlined his expansionist
views and gave the secretary a copy of his Texas notes to give to the
president. 4
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In these notes Butler forcefully argued his belief that future
American security depended heavily on the acquisition of Texas. He
maintained that the boundary between the United States and Mex-
ico, the Sabine River, was inadequate. In his opinion, a foreign na-
tion was too close to the important trading center at New Orleans,
and that the Sabine failed to provide a formidable enough natural
barrier between the Mexican and American republics. Moreover,
Butler feared that under Mexico's tenuous control the potentially rich
and strategically located Texas presented tempting opportunities for
the extension of Great Britain's influence in North America. British
ascendancy in the region could permanently block further American
expansion in the West, thus limiting American economic and ter·
ritorial growth. Only by acquiring Texas could the United States ef-
fectively secure, in Butler's words, the "weakest and least defensi-
ble" of its borders and, at the same time, assure American expan-
sion to the Pacific. And as far as Butler was concerned, only Mexico
stood in the way.'
Butler expressed confidence that the Republic of Mexico - rent
with factional interests and still locked in a struggle for independence
with Spain - could be persuaded to sell Texas. He reasoned that a
combination of elements, particularly the increasing influx of indepen-
dent American pioneers to Texas and Mexico's internal instability
and virtual bankruptcy eventually would convince Mexican leaders
to swallow their pride and accept a reasonable offer from the United
States. Arguing that the separation of Texas from Mexico was in-
evitable, Butler conjectured that the Mexican government must
already realize this and would be eager to capitalize on an American
proposition of this kind before the fact. Butler concluded his
arguments to Jackson by pointing out the political benefits ofobtain-
ing Texas: "The people of the South and particularly the West," he
wrote, "feel an interest on this subject so deep, so engrossing, as to
secure for that man who may accomplish the recovery of Texas, their
thanks, their confidence, and their gratitude .... '"
Butler's notes to Jackson could not have arrived at the White
House at a more opportune time, nor could they have had a greater
impact on the president. Unknown to Butler, his notes reached
Jackson at a time when the new administration was busy formulating
a Mexican policy. Though Jackson envisioned the United States stret-
ching from Florida to California, he had stated publicly during the
1820 controversy over the Adams-Onis Treaty that Texas was not
essential to the protection of the American western frontier.7 Butler's
ideas, together with the passage of some nine years, changed
Jackson's mind. Only a day after reading Butler's persuasive Texas
arguments, he informed Secretary of State Van Buren that the ac-
quisition of Texas was to be a goal of the administration. In several
EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 5
t
l
hastily-prepared notes to Van Buren, Jackson outlined both his
motives for wanting to acquire Texas and the inducements to be of-
fered Mexico for the region. For the most part, these notes merely
reiterated Butler's earlier beliefs that the acquisition of Texas would
provide the United States with a more secure western border and that
the exchange would benefit Mexico by relieving that country of a
potentially troublesome territory. Jackson revealed to Van Buren that
he would be willing to pay the Mexican government as much as $5
million for an unencumbered Texas, with a western border running
roughly from the Gulf of Mexico north along the Nueces River to its
source and then due north to the forty-second degree, north latitude,
the American boundary established by the Transcontinental treaty.
Butler's arguments had a significant impact on the president's Texas
policy and on the timing of his Texas initiative.'
Van Buren acted swiftly. He organized Jackson's scribbled notes
and disjointed reflections on Texas into a diplomatic dispatch. On
August 25, 1829, Van Buren sent this dispatch by special messenger
to Joel R. Poinsett, the American charge de'affaires in Mexico. The
messenger was none other than Colonel Anthony Butler. Before
Butler reached Mexico City, however, Poinsett, who himself had work-
ed unsuccessfully to obtain Texas for the administration of John Quin-
cy Adams, had been recalled to Washington at the request of the Mex-
ican government. 9 Jackson now faced a worrisome dilemma. He could
either recall Butler from his mission, thus temporarily postponing
his administration's attempt to purchase Texas, or he could replace
Poinsett with Butler, though he believed him to be too hot-headed
for delicate negotiations. Jackson found both choices distasteful. But
with the Democratic press clamoring for the "reacquisition" of Texas
and with the continuing immigration of Americans to Texas further
straining relations with Mexico, Jackson felt compelled to choose the
latter course - the appointment of Butler as charge d'affaires to Mex-
ico." The exigencies of politics and diplomacy made delay in the open-
ing of Texas negotiations unthinkable. Once the decision to appoint
Butler was made, Jackson decided to personally guide him in his
negotiations with Mexico. Jackson hoped that he could keep a firm
rein on Butler and at the same time maintain control of the Texas
negotiations. 11
On October 16, 1829, the State Department sent Butler word of
his appointment along with "official instructions," but his true in·
structions came from the president himself!' In a letter marked
"strictly confidential," dated October 10, 1829, Jackson instructed
him to work toward two objectives: Mexican ratification of a treaty
of commerce and the acquisition of Texas. The president's dispatch,
which Butler labeled a "remarkable communication," clearly
reflected the intensity of Jackson's obsession for obtaining Texas and
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intimated that deviousness was not to be ruled out as a means to pro-
mote policy. Jackson informed his new envoy to offer Mexico up to
$5 million for the cession of territory lying between the Nueces and
Sabine rivers. If a Nueces boundary was unacceptable, then Butler
was to offer smaller increments of that amount for borders farther
to the east. Once the money changed hands, Jackson admitted that
he did not care in whose pocket it ended up or how it was spent. He
even implied that part of the sum could be used to appeal to the self-
interests of Mexican government officials, writing: "I scarcely ever
knew a Spaniard who was not the slave of averice [sic], and it is not
improbable that this weakness may be worth a great deal to us, in
this case." Jackson wanted no time lost in opening the Texas talks
because each day the Republic of Mexico grew more suspicious of the
relationship between the American government and the Texans.
Jackson feared that ifthe Texans pushed for independence, then Mex-
ico would hold the United States accountable for their actions.
Jackson closed his message to Butler, cautioning: "Let a listening
ear, a silent tongue, and a steadfast heart, the three jewels of wisdom,
guard every advance which you make on the subject of Texas."'"
Jackson's instructions to Butler were ill-conceived and open to
misinterpretation. Apparently Jackson wanted to use the dispatch
to outline the parameters in which Butler was to work and to sug-
gest a possible Texas strategy, but instead his tone convinced the en-
voy that there were to be no constraints to his negotiations. Moreover,
several readings of the message persuaded Butler that the White
House was more interested in results than in methods. Aware that
the acquisition of Texas could further his own career, Butler used
any tactic that promised success - regardless of ethical considera·
tions. After all, he surmised, Jackson's note seemed to sanction
everything from legitimate diplomacy to bribery.
Butler arrived at his post in Mexico City in late 1829 and found
the capital torn by revolution. Before he had an opportunity to gauge
Mexican attitudes toward Texas, his mission was dealt two serious
setbacks. First, on January 9, 1830, EI Sol, the leading conservative
newspaper in the country, ran an editorial revealing Butler's inten-
tions in Mexico. The paper lashed out at the American goal to ac-
quire Texas and labeled any such purchase attempt an insult and
a disgrace to the proud people of Mexico." Second, Manual de Mier
y Teran, the Mexican commander sent to Texas in 1828 to evaluate
conditions there, published his long-awaited report. In this report
Teran concluded that the Americans living in Texas were a dangerous
threat to Mexican sovereignty over the area and that the Jackson
administration would stop at nothing to obtain the land west of the
Sabine. He recommended a number of reforms in Texas, all aimed
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at tightening Mexican control and restricting further American im-
migration. With the United States the subject of such resentment and
scorn, Butler decided not to push immediately for the purchase of
Texas. I5
Though Butler advised delaying the opening of negotiations,
Jackson preached immediate action. Intelligence reports filtering into
Washington indicated that a "project" was under foot by American
adventurers - presumably led by Sam Houston - with the goal to
foment revolution in Texas to sever the province from Mexico. In
several dispatches written in 1830 and 1831, Jackson informed Butler
of this purported plot and vowed to do everything in his power to foil
the shadowy plan. Jackson realized, however, that constitutional
limitations, together with sketchy and unreliable information on the
details of the plot, made preventive measures difficult. He also feared
that any revolt in Texas would be blamed on American government
machinations and would preclude indefinitely the peaceful acquisi-
tion of the province. With this in mind Jackson suggested that Butler
inform the Mexican government of the rumored plan, then offer to
purchase Texas. Jackson believed that confronted with the option of
either suppressing a revolt in Texas or accepting cash for the transfer
of the burdensome territory, the Mexican government would choose
the money.16
Jackson's call for action was not ignored. Butler indirectly broach-
ed the subject of Texas with the government of Anastasio Bustamante
on October 6, 1831. Meeting with the Mexican minister of foreign
affairs, Butler discreetly mentioned the purchase offer. The Mexican
minister abruptly rejected it. His reason for not entertaining the of-
fer was that the Mexican federal government held no national do-
main and exercised no power of transfer over Mexican territory. The
individual states shaped Mexican land policy, emphasized the foreign
minister, and only they had the power of alienation. As long as Mex-
ico continued to operate as a federal republic under the Constitution
of 1824, the obstacles to the American acquisition ofTexas appeared
insurmountable. In addition, Butler realized that popular sentiment
in Mexico was so adamantly opposed to the transfer of Texas that
the Bustamante government could not consider the offer for fear of
sparking a revolt. Convinced that any further discussions would be
counterproductive, Butler dropped the subject and chose instead to
bide his time!'
Butler's inaction did not please the president. Jackson continued
to receive reports of a Texas revolt in the planning and in 1932 he
again urged immediate action to stem the rumored uprising. Once
again Butler responded. On July 2 and 10, 1832, Butler met with
Lucas Alaman, the retired Mexican foreign minister, but still the
guiding spirit in the Foreign Office, to discuss the boundary issue.
l..r-. ----------------
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Their sessions were cordial but unproductive. Alaman rejected the
offer for the purchase of Texas while insisting that a treaty of limits
agreeing to the Sabine boundary be approved. Butler, however,
argued that the Neches River, some fifty miles west of the Sabine,
was the border. Having no instructions on this point, he contended
that both the Neches and the Sabine emptied into Lake Sabine, mak-
ing the former the western tributary of the latter. This reasoning led
him to conclude that the west bank of the Sabine, referred to in the
Adams-Onis Treaty as the western boundary of Louisiana, was ac·
tually a reference to the west bank of the Neches. Since the boun·
dary claims of both countries were based on the Adams-Onis Treaty,
this fundamental disagreement posed potential problems. Unable to
reach a settlement, both agreed to refer the thorny question to a boun-
dary commission. The inability of the two diplomats to agree on the
presumably simple boundary question foreshadowed rough times
ahead for the more complex Texas discussion. 18
Though Butler had been rebuffed, he left these meetings outward-
ly confident that the goal of obtaining Texas was possible. Even after
the Bustamante government fell in late 1832 and Santa Anna organiz-
ed a new cabinet, Butler's confidence remained apparently unshaken.
He conceded that although such government changes might delay
the American acquisition of Texas, they would never defeat it. He
vowed to Jackson in early 1833: "I will succeed in uniting T[exasJ
to our country before I am done with the subject or I will forfeit my
hand."t9 Butler's buoyant optimism, however, was only a facade in-
tended to placate Jackson's burning desire for Texas. Inwardly he
was aware that he had been in Mexico for three years and had made
little progress toward his goal. He also realized that Jackson, evidenc-
ed by his communications, was growing increasingly impatient. Fear-
ing a possible termination of his appointment if success continued
to elude him, Butler decided that bolder actions were justified.
In 1833 Butler scrapped the slow and uncertain Texas negotia-
tions and instead advocated three separate schemes to gain the ter-
ritory. For the first time since his appointment, Butler, not Jackson,
attempted to shape policy pertaining to Texas. Much to Jackson's
chagrin, his once tight rein on Butler had been loosened.
Wasting no time, Butler broached his first plan to Jackson in
February. He suggested that the United States float a sizable loan
to the bankrupt Mexican government, with Texas as security. He
assured Jackson that Mexico's instability would cause her to default
on the repayment, resulting in the American acquisition of Texas as
provided in the terms of the loao. 20 Jackson received this suggestion
in March, but never approved it; he had other matters on his mind.
Shortly before Butler's dispatch reached the White House, Jackson
had received a letter from his friend in Texas, Sam Houston, inform-
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ing him that Texas was soon going to petition the Mexican govern-
ment for separate statehood. Fearing such a petition would be sum-
marily rejected and that such a rejection would spark a revolt, Jackson
instructed Butler to suspend all negotiations for Texas by April."
Jackson's order killed the loan scheme, but it awakened Butler
to the possibility ofyet another plan for acquiring Texas. Hoping to
take advantage of the undefined boundary between Mexico and the
United States as well as the Texas petition for statehood, Butler pro-
posed that the United States occupy eastern Texas to the Neches River
- the American claim - and then wait. Likening this move to Presi-
dent James Monroe's occupation of East Florida, Butler believed that
such forceful action would either make the Mexican government more
amenable to negotiations or else provoke war between the two coun-
tries. Either way, the United States was sure to win Texas. Moreover,
American troops stationed along the Neches River would be in an
excellent position to provide support to the Texas insurgents should
an uprising occur. Despite Butler's impassioned plea for decisive ac-
tion, Jackson flatly rejected the plan as irresponsible and impolitic.
Jackson was unwilling to employ force and aggressive actions as a
means of achieving American territorial goals.:t2
Though Butler preferred a more forceful tack with Mexico,
Jackson's displeasure forced him to reformulate his Texas strategy.
This led to his third Texas plan, a plan that was much less direct
than his previous two and at the same time more conniving. On Oc-
tober 28, 1833, Butler relayed to the president the outlines of his
"foolproof' scheme. Butler revealed that he had been approached by
a leading Mexican national who had a great deal of influence over
Santa Anna. This unnamed source informed Butler that Texas could
be acquired if the American government were willing to pay high-
ranking government officials sums varying from $3,000 to $500,000.
The names of these officials, however, were not revealed. Remember-
ing that Jackson had instructed him to use the money at his own
discretion, Butler agreed to these terms provided the cession ofTexas
was guaranteed.
Obviously aware of the immorality of this bribery, Butler defended
his action by rationalizing that such methods were common in Mex-
ican business and politics. Sharing the racial and ethnocentric views
common to most Americans at that time, he concluded that the Mex-
ican overture "developes [sic] once the character of these people,
selfish, corrupt, utterly unprincipled. Any of them may be successfully
appealed to through their cupidity."" Jackson had expressed the same
sentiments to Butler four years earlier.
Butler at last believed Texas to be within his grasp. Indeed, all
that stood in the way of this transfer were two formalities: firming
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up the details of the transaction and obtaining Jackson's approval.
Neither would present problems, thought the confident Butler.
Jackson's response soon shattered this confidence. He answered
Butler's letter immediately, chiding him for his failure to put such
sensitive and damning information in cipher and berating him for
grossly misinterpreting his original instructions. His dander up,
Jackson especially resented Butler's intimations that unethical prac-
tices such as bribery had been sanctioned by the White House. At-
tempting to set the record straight and perhaps even to vindicate his
own reputation for the sake of posterity, Jackson reworded his in-
structions to Butler and clarified his own intent. Jackson stated rather
pointedly that the $5 million was to be used only as payment to Mex-
ico for the cession of an unencumbered Texas. According to him,
bribery was never considered, nor could it be condoned. He ended his
letter by admonishing Butler:
. , . all the United States is interested in is an unincumbered fsic]
cession, not how Mexico applies the consideration. Therefore I
repeat that the best means to secure this object is left to your
discretion - but I admonish you to give these shrewd fellows no
room to charge you with tampering with their officers to obtain
the cession thro [sic) corruption ... let us have a boundery [sic]
without the imputation of corruption, and I will hail you welcome
with it here - none else. 24
Despite Jackson's apparent contempt for Butler and his unethical
plans, he allowed him to remain at his post.
Butler considered Jackson's reprimand to be a betrayal of his
former instructions. He assured Jackson that success in obtaining
Texas peacefully could only be guaranteed through "bribery or by
presents." He reminded Jackson that only two years before his in-
structions from the White House had mentioned that the disburse-
ment of the purchase money was" a matter of nO consequence to the
government." Butler interpreted this statement to mean that he
would have a free hand in negotiating for Texas. For some inex-
plicable reason, Butler concluded, Jackson had changed his mind."
Butler also repeated his contention that the only viable option to
"bribery and corruption" was bold action in eastern Texas: "If you
will withdraw me from this place and make the movement to possess
that part of Texas which is ours [west to the Neches], placing me at
the head of the country to be occupied, I will pledge my head that
we have all we desire in less than six months .... "2ft Jackson refused
to agree to these tactics and instead instructed Butler to drop the
Texas talks and to concentrate on the formalization of a boundary
agreement with Mexico. Frustrated and bewildered, Butler hoped to
salvage his Texas mission and requested a leave of absence on July
1, 1834." He wanted to return to Washington and explain his plans
personally to Jackson. The leave was granted, and after completing
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boundary discussions with the Mexican government, Butler left for
the American capital on April 29, 1835, almost a year after he had
asked for a leave.
Butler arrived in Washington in June, and during his one-month
stay had meetings with Jackson and Secretary of State John For-
syth." Butler argued passionately for his "bribery" scheme and even
submitted a written report on its origin and details. In this report
he revealed that Don Ignacio Hernandez, a Catholic priest and the
father confessor to Santa Anna's sister, was to aid him in negotiating
for Texas. In fact, Butler included in his report a note from Hernandez
which stated: "I have already ascertained the opinions of all the par-
ties whose influence it will be necessary to conciliate and assure you
that all difficulties are removed." According to Butler, the priest was
"the manager of all the secret negotiations of the palace," and his
word could be trusted. Butler concluded his report by appealing to
Jackson's expansionist sentiment: " ... the treaty which gives us
Texas would only be the first of a series which must at last give us
dominion over the whole of that tract of territory known as New Mex-
ico and the upper and lower California ..."" Expediency, not morali-
ty, seemed to be Butler's overriding concern, and all the while his
unmistakable conclusion was that Texas was at last obtainable.
Butler later claimed that in his private talks with the president,
Jackson had agreed to the bribery plan, but had instructed him to
"settle it with Mr. Forsyth and manage the affair as you please but
do not let me know it." In addition, Jackson, according to Butler,
"voluntarily promised" him the governorship ofTexas should he suc-
ceed in acquiring the territory. And finally, Jackson instructed Butler
to return to his Mexico City post, assuring him that while he could
remain there for "as long as was necessary" to complete the Texas
talks, time was of the essence.
His faith in Jackson renewed, and eager to consummate the deal
for Texas, Butler looked forward to returning to Mexico. The night
before he was to leave Washington he received his official instruc-
tions from Forsyth, but in his haste did not bother to read them. He
assumed that these instructions merely reiterated what had already
been agreed upon in his talks with Jackson." His assumption prov-
ed to be wrong.
Butler left Washington in July, 1835, chosing to travel to Mexico
at a leisurely pace along a slow, overland route that took him through
Texas. He arrived in Mexico in November, at which time he unpack-
ed and read his official instructions for the first time. He was shock-
ed to discover that Secretary Forsyth's instructions forbade him from
using "equivocal" methods to obtain Texas and stipulated that all
Texas negotiations be terminated by the time Congress convened in
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December. Obviously Jackson had had second thoughts about sanc-
tioning Butler's unethical plan and as a result revoked his promise
of support. With less than a month to work for Texas, an enraged
Butler fired off a dispatch to Jackson, asking him if this timetable
were to be adhered to. If it proved to be, the testy envoy had decided
to resign his post, concluding that the December termination date
and Jackson's duplicity made his job impossible and his official mis-
sion no longer tolerable." Jackson never answered Butler's dispatch
because in December, shortly after the Texas revolution began, the
Mexican government demanded Butler's recall. His slow return
through Texas had convinced Mexican government officials that he
had helped to foment the revolt east of the Rio Grande. Eager to
replace the troublesome Butler, Jackson quickly complied with the
Mexican demand. On March 26, 1836, Powhatan Ellis replaced Butler
as charge d'affaires to the Republic of Mexico, bringing the South
Carolinian's Mexican mission to a disappointing close.32
Anthony Butler's six-year mission to acquire Texas for the United
States ended in failure, frustration, and bitter recrimination. The
reasons for his lack of success were threefold. First, Jackson's misguid-
ed and naive attempts at guiding the negotiations from the White
House while unapprised of the anti-American sentiment in Mexico,
led Butler to initiate Texas negotiations at a time when success was
all but impossible. Moreover, the contradictory signals received from
Jackson concerning the acceptability of various diplomatic tactics kept
Butler constantly off-balance in his talks with Mexican government
officials and uncertain as to Jackson's true wishes.
Second, Butler's ambition, motives of personal aggrandizement
and lack ofdiplomatic experience were partly to blame, for the failure
of the mission. Indeed, evidence shows that while charge to Mexico,
Butler also worked as an agent for both the Arkansas and Texas Land
Company and the Trinity Land Company, attempting to secure Mex-
ican recognition of their grants in Texas. Had the envoy been suc-
cessful in this and in negotiating the transfer of Texas to the United
States, he stood to receive a total of one million acres of Texas land
for his efforts. In addition, Butler hoped to use the successful com-
pletion of his mission as a springboard to other appointments -
possibly even the governorship ofTexas as Jackson had once promis-
ed." With his financial and professional future depending on the out-
come of his diplomatic assignment, it is no wonder that Butler
overzealously pursued the goals of the Jackson administration. To
have even had a rea] chance of success, the Mexican negotiations re-
quired the subtle and deft touch of an experienced career diplomat,
not the inexperienced efforts of a self-centered zealot.
The third and perhaps the most important reason for Butler's
failure with Mexico itself. With or without bribery, the American goal
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to acquire Texas peacefully from Mexico was nearly impossible. Mex·
ican pride, hostile public opinion against such a transfer, constitu·
tional obstacles, and persistent governmental instability prevented
the Mexican government from seriously considering the American
offer. As rumors circulated in Mexico City charging the United States
with conspiring to grab the land west of the Sabine, Texas became
a symbol to the Mexican people of their government's willingness to
resist American aggression and expansion. Almost certainly, a
government that would have ceded Texas to the United States would
have been overthrown. That Butler did not realize this and thus in-
form Jackson of the futility of negotiating for Texas was perhaps the
major failure of his mission, for, in the final analysis, his continued
attempts to seek the unobtainable only widened the political and
philosophical rift between the United States and Mexico.
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